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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the seriousness of the offense under

investigation itself create exigent circumstances of the kind
that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search
where the State fails to establish an emergency threatening
life or limb?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute for value case, involving a search of
a residential premises which uncovered incriminating evidence.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The appellant's Motion to Suppress the seizure of
certain evidence, specifically, bales of marijuana and drug
paraphenalia, came before the District Court of the Third Judicial
District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Judge
Judith M. Billings, presiding, on the 4th day of August, 1986.
On the 26th day of August, 1986, the appellant was
found guilty by jury verdict of the offense of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On the 3rd day of October, 1986, the appellant was
sentenced by the Honorable Judith M. Billings to serve a term
of 0 to 5 years in the Utah State Prison, with said sentence to
be stayed and the appellant to be placed on probation and serve
30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail.
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STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIEW
At approximately 7:30 a.m. on April 14, 1986, at
2049 Atkin Avenue, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a residence
shared by the appellant, her minor child, and her male companion,
Terry L. Bakker, there was loud knocking on the front door.

It

awakened the appellant and Mr. Bakker went to investigate.
The appellant remained in bed a few seconds until she
heard a crash and the screen door slam.
and looked out the front window.

She stood up on the bed

She saw a male person running

down the street, but she could not see Mr. Bakker.

She got up,

put her clothes on, and went to the front room, where Mr. Bakker
was standing.

He stated, "Somebody shot me, Babe."

Mr. Bakker showed the defendant where he had been shot.
He looked down to his chest and fell into a rocking chair.
told her to call the police.
911.

He

She went to the bedroom and called

She returned to the front room.

Mr. Bakker was not there.

She went outside the house and looked down the street.

She

saw no one, except Mr. Bakker, who was lying underneath his
truck.
her.

She took him from underneath his truck and held him to
She heard sirens coming up the street, so she laid him

down and flagged the police down.

She went back and picked him

up.
The police arrived and took her into the house.

She

called her sister at approximately 7:45 a.m. and told her that
Mr. Bakker had been shot and to hurry to her.

- ?-

She then stood

in the front room and watched Mr. Bakker through the front
screen door u n t i l her s i s t e r arrived at approximately 8:10 a.m.
At t h a t time, the a p p e l l a n t ' s s i s t e r noticed the
ambulance was approaching the scene, and there was yellow police
tape around the house.

The police were taking p i c t u r e s and

were hauling things out of the house.

The police did not leave

an inventory l i s t with the appellant, nor at the residence.
One policeman took the appellant and her s i s t e r to
the backyard.
The media arrived at approximately 8:30 a.m. and questioned the policeman in charge.

The media l e f t ,

returned at approximately 9:00 a.m.

He s t a t e d ,

and one of them
f,

I got down to

the s t a t i o n , and they asked if I got p i c t u r e s of them bringing
marijuana out of trie house."

The s h e r i f f s a i d ,

fl

no comment.11

While the a p p e l i a n t ! s s i s t e r was t a l k i n g to the
policemen, one of them said Mr. Bakker had been involved with
the police and drugs for years, and t h a t they had found 3 bales
of marijuana in the "basement."

Sne asked why they were not

taking that outside the house as they had the other marijuana.
The policeman said they were waiting for a search warrant to
a r r i v e at the scene.
The a p p e l l a n t ' s s i s t e r l e f t the scene to take her
mother to work.

When she returned at approximately 11:30 a.m.,

the police had the search warrant.
The police removed that marijuana from the house at
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approximately 1:00 p.m.

They removed the yellow tape from

around the house and left at approximately between 2:U0 p.m.
and 2 :15 p.m.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE CASE
The evidence from the warrantless search and seizure
should have been suppressed; and without such evidence, there
was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant.
Therefore, the case should have been dismissed at
trial.
ARGUMENT
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE UNDER
INVESTIGATION DOES NOT ITSELF CREATE
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE KIND THAT
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT JUSTIFY A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHERE THE STATE
FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN EMERGENCY THREATENING LIFE OR LIMB.
This appeal is based upon the claim that the warrantless search in the instant case was constitutionally unjustified.
The State contends that the motion was properly denied in its
entirety on the ground that since the house was a "murder scene,"
the search was wholly permissible.
only partly correct.

In so arguing, the State is

Issues of the propriety of the search of a

"murder scene11 and the extent to which such a search may be upheld
are controlled by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Mincey v. Arizona,
(1978).

437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. Z408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290

The Mincey decision rejected the notion of a blanket

so-called "murder scene exception" to the warrantless requirements
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of the Fourth Amendment.

Instead, the court held that the

well-accepted "exigency11 doctrine, along with its limitations,
were applicable to such a situation.

There at 437 U.S. 392-

393, S.Ct. 2413-2414, 57 L.Ed. 2d 299-300, the court held:
The State's second argument
in support of Arizona's catigorical
exception to the warrant requirement
is that a possible homicide presents
an emergency situation demanding
immediate action. We do not question
the right of the police to respond
to emergency situations. Numerous
state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does
not bar police officers from making
warrantless entries and searches
when they reasonably believe that a
person within is in need of immediate
aid. Similarly, when the police come
upon a scene of a homicide they may
make a prompt warrantless search of
the area to see if there are other
victims or if a killer is still on
the premises. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler,
supra, 435~U.S. [499] , at 510, 9 8
S.Ct. [1942], at 1950-1951 [56 L.Ed.
2d 486.] fThe need to protect or
preserve life or avoid serious injury
is justification for what would otherwase be illegal absent an exigency or
emergency.f Wayne v. United States,
115 U.S. App.D.C. 234, 241, 318 F.2d
205, 212 (opinion of Berger, J.)
And the police may seize any evidence
that is in plain view during the
course of their legitimate emergency
activities. Michigan v. Tyler, supra,
436 U.S. at 510, 98 S.Ct. [2022]
at 2037-2038 [29 L.Ed.2d 564]. (Emphasis
added.)
But a warrantless search must be
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation"; ' Terry v.
Ohio, 3y2 U.S. [1] at Z^-Zb, 88 S.CJt.
TTTO8] at 1882 [20 L.Ed.2d 889] [44
1
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Ohio Ops. 2d 383] and it simply cannot
be contended that this search was
justified by any emergency threatening life or limb ..,..(Emphasis
added.)
Applying these tests, it is clear that a motion to suppress
would have been properly denied in this case had the objects
been in the officers1

fl

plain view11 as they entered the outside

property in response to the emergency call.

Further, the same

conclusion could have been reached surrounding the trail of
blood leading to the doorway where the deceased was shot.
was not the case, however.

This

Here, at the time of their entrance

onto the outside property, the police were informed that the
killers had never entered the home, and, in fact, had fled the
premises.

As a result, looking throughout the home, opening

doors, allegedly to find further victims or the assailant,
particularly with respect to the linen closet, was not part of
the Mprompt ... search of the area to see if there are other
victims or if a killer is still on the premises . .." deemed
permissible by the court in Mincey, supra.
It is well-settled that, subject to a few narrow exceptions, searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,

88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed2d 576 (1967).

Those seeking to rely on

an exception to the warrant requirement have the burden of demonstrating its applicability.

E.g., People v. Williams, 613 P.2d
-6-

879 (Colo. 1980).
In the instant case, there were two analytically
distinct searches conducted by the police.

The first was during

the initial entry onto the outside property in response to the
emergency call reporting the shooting of Terry L. Bakker.

The

second occurred when, after becoming aware of the fact the
killers had fled and that the only other occupant of the house
—

Michelle Pursifull — was outside the structure attending to

the decedent, and after securing the premises, the police conducted a more extensive search inside the house and seized
several items of incriminating evidence.

The basis and scope

of permissible police activity at the time of the initial entry
onto the property, and after the permises were secured, will be
analyzed in turn.
The court may find that the initial entry onto the
outside premises was gained by consent.
support this finding.

The evidence would

The record does specify appellant placed

the call to the police after Mr. Bakker was shot, and it is reasonably inferable from this that the call which summoned the police
was placed with the express or implied agreement of both the
appellant and Terry L. Bakker.
But, although the appellant did not expressly limit
her consent to the later police presence inside her home, at no
time did she make any statements or engage in any conduct which
would lead the police to believe she desired an unlimited search
-7-

of her home.
Further, the police who responded to her plea for
assistance would have understood from all the circumstances
that the appellant desired only a limited search of her home.
The home Mis accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protection,11 Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct.
424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966), for it is quite clearly a place as
to which there exists a justified expectation of privacy against
unreasonable intrusion.

Katz v. United States, supra.

It is

beyond question, therefore, that an unconsented police entry
into a house constitutes a search within the meaning of Katz.
Here, there can be no
assistance

doubt that the request for

and the conduct of appellant after the police arrived

suggested her consent to the entry onto the outside premises
for the purpose of getting medical assistance for Mr. Bakker.
But, knowing as fact there was simply one victim, who was under a
vehicle in the driveway; and knowing as fact the killer had
never entered the house; and knowing as fact that the killer
had fled the premises following the shooting; and knowing as
fact that the appellant was outside the residence attending to
the victim; the court should conclude that knowing all of the
existing factual circumstances, the police could reasonably
understand that the appellant had placed a limitation upon
her consent for the search of her home.

This is prticularly

true in light of the fact she never gave consent for the police
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to actually enter her residence, nor was she ever told of the
extensive search proposed by the police — without even an opportunity to object.
The court should conclude that knowing all of the existing factual circumstances, the police who responded to her
plea for assistance could reasonably understand that appellant
placed a limitation upon her consent for the search of the outside
premises.

See People v. Annerino, 97 111. App.3d 240, 52 111.

Dec. 714, 422 N.E.2d 923 (1981) (defendant's consent to have
deceased removed from his kitchen not consent to enter crawl
space to retrieve bullet); State v. Young, 135 Ariz. 437, 661
P.2d 1138 (App. 1982) (bartender is calling police to bar where
shooting occurred, had not thereby consented to a wholesale
search of the premises, including removal of ceiling tiles to
find gun); State v. Jolley, 68 N.C. App. 33, 314 S.E.2d 134
(1984) (defendant's summoning of police after she shot her
husband was consent lfto come into the house to aid the victim11
and thus did not justify 6-hour search of home thereafter).
Moreover, these facts, combined with the fact the
residence was surrounded and secured by police officers, in
the words of Mincey, ncan hardly be rationalized in terms of
the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.!!
Here, under the Mincey standard that a warrantless
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search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justify its initiation, the facts simply fail to establish that
the search of the linen closet was justified by any emergency
threatening life or limb.
After having received details of the shooting during
the emergency call, and once upon the outside prmeises, the
police were in a position to observe the body and to conclude
that death occurred by violent means.

The police were also in

a position to observe that a trail of blood led to the doorway
of the house in question, and allowed them to conclude not only
that the deceased had been shot in that doorway, but had subsequently staggered out to the driveway.

Anything the police

saw in plain view on the outside premises, or in the doorway
that might provide evidence of how the death occurred was subject
to seizure, and testimony concerning that evidence should not
be suppressed.
But, to the extent that the police search activities
at the time of entry into the dwelling went beyond discovery
of items located in plain view, they must be supportable by the
doctrine of exigent circumstances.
CONCLUSION
In an appropriate case, a prompt and limited warrantless search of a homicide scene may be necessary to determine
if there are other victims or if the perpetrator of the crime is

-10-

still on the premises but undetected.

Mincey v. Arizona, supra.

It must be remembered, however, that a warrantless search is
strictly circumscribed by the exigency which creates its justification.

In no case may a specific emergency be used to

justify a general exploratory search.

The guiding principles

are that a search based on exigent circumstances requires the
presence of an immediate crisis, and the police response must
be strictly limited to that action necessary to respond to the
exigency.

People v. Gomez, 632 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1981); McCall

v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1981).
In the instant case, the police were notified of a
single murder, that the shooting had taken place in the doorway,
that the killers had never entered the home and fled the outside
premises, that the deceased1s body was in the driveway, and that
there was no other victim.

Once the house and outside premises

were secured by the police, and after the appellant continued to
be excluded from the house, any exigent circumstances disappeared.
In addition, having secured the premises, there was no
further danger to the police or to others and there was no risk
that relevant evidence might be destroyed.

Nor can the State

rely on the plain view exception to support their later search
beyond the doorway since that exception requires a previous justification for the presence of the officers.
640 P.2d 226 (Colo. 1982).

People v. Franklin,

Absent a warrant, the subsequent

search was permissible only if the police obtained consent to
-11-

this condurct.

No such consent was given.

At the court in Lara v. State, 464 So.2d 1173 (Fla.
1985) states:
We find that the exigent circumstance exception applies when
police are called to the scene of
a homicide and that it allows an
immediate warrantless search of the
area to determine the number and
condition of the victims or survivors,
to see if the killer is still on the
premises, and to preserve the crime
scene. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed. 2d 290
(1978); Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d
365 (Fla. 1981), cert, denied, 455
U.S. 1035, 102 S.Ct. 1739, 72 L.Ed.2d
153 (1982). Id., at 1177-1178.
No such exigent circumstances existed in the instant
case.
Therefore, the evidence obtained by the unreasonable
search of residence should have been supressed and the case
dismissed because of insufficient evidence.
There was no

evidence that the defendant dealt in drugs

nor even that she knew the drugs were in the house.

She was con-

victed solely on the grounds that she was living in the residence.
This case should be reversed; or, at least in the alternate
remanded for a new trial.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARQUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument under Category No. 2
of the new order ot his court filed January 8, 1986.

(Priority

of Cases Scheduled for Oral Argument, 25 Utah Adv. Rep 4.)
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Respectfully submitted this

i ^ J-^ d a y

of May, 1987.
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PftlL L. HANSEN

800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the JLfJ2~May of May, 1987,
four (4) copies of Brief of Appellant were served on the
office of the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84114, addressed to the

attention of Sandra Sjogren, Assistant Utah Attorney General.
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ADDENDUM

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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PHIL L. HANSEN (1343)
Attorney for Defendant
800 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2467
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,

Case No.

-v-

CR-86-754

MICHELE DAVIS PURSIFULL,
Defendant.

Notice is hereby given that the above-named defendant hereby
appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the judgment
and sentence rendered against her on the 3rd day of October, 1986,
by the Honorable Judith M. Billings.
DATED t h i s

#.«£ ^/ d a y of O c t o b e r ,

1986.

l-r-&

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney for Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was served this
2S^}^day
of October, 1986, on the Office of the Salt Lake County
Attorney, 231 E. 400 So., Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, addressed to
the attention of Rodwicke Ybarra, Deputy County Attorney.

